colonial powers were more important than taking a strong moral stand on the issue of colonialism. Thus, in the postwar period the United States did little to pressure her wartime allies to grant immediate independence to colonial subjects. 3 In the case of Indonesia the United States preferred to let Great Britain play the role of mediator between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic which had been pro claimed in August 1945. Later, from July 1947 until the end of 1949, the United States did intervene and urged the Netherlands to make substantial concessions. Especially in the period 1945-47, Washington advocated continuation of a strong Dutch presence in Indonesia which would be advantageous to the Netherlands and strengthen the Western alliance. Furthermore, a restoration of the Indonesian economy under Dutch auspices would be most advantageous to the world economy and the United States, which needed many of the valuable Indonesian commodities.
From August 1945 until July 1947 the Netherlands controlled only small enclaves on Java and Sumatra, the two most important islands of its Asian empire. The areas under Republican control during this period were the most productive of the archi pelago. In order to prevent an outflow of many commodities from Republican-con trolled areas to Singapore and elsewhere, the Netherlands imposed a blockade and on January 29, 1947, issued stringent export regulations. These regulations re quired export permits to be issued by the Netherlands Indies government's Depart ment of Economic Affairs and forbade the export of so-called estate products. 4 Yet, it was tempting to circumvent the Dutch blockade and establish contact with the Republic. Some American businessmen in particular concluded that perhaps they might miss the boat and not be able to share in a most lucrative trade with the Indo nesian R epublic.5 Also the Indonesian Republic was eager to trade with the outside world. Its economic condition was precarious, largely as a result of the Dutch blockade. It was felt that trade with the United States and a possible infusion of American capital would have a most beneficial effect on the Indonesian economy.
The first American business firm to establish contact with the Republic was the New York-based Isbrandtsen and Company, In c., which concluded a contract with Yogyakarta in March 1947. By its terms Isbrandtsen would act as the Republic's commission merchant and carrier from Cheribon or Probolinggo to sell its commodi ties. Furthermore, Isbrandsten would act as the Republic's commission merchant to purchase American commodities with the proceeds of the sale of cargoes. For its services Isbrandsten would receive a commission of 5 percent.
The company vessel, the Martin Behrman, took on a large supply of "estate products" in Cheribon in February 1947, but it was seized by Dutch officials and brought to Batavia in early March, where its cargo was unloaded and confiscated. Isbrandtsen bitterly complained about this treatment and sent its representative, James Ryan, to Batavia in order to secure the restitution of the valuable cargo. Ryan, who quickly antagonized Dutch officials because of his arrogant and bluster ing behavior, failed to persuade the authorities to relent. Weston was very anxious to return to Indonesia to promote his company's busi ness ventures as well as personal interests. But the Netherlands Indies government refused to grant him a visa. The Director of the Department of Economic Affairs, J. E. van Hoogstraaten, was vigorously opposed to Weston's reentry. Van Hoogstraaten felt that Weston was an "unreliable adventurer" who had deceived him dur ing his previous visit by making false promises and representations. Allowing him to reenter, van Hoogstraaten pointed out, would not be in the national interest and would cause more trouble than that instigated by James Ryan. Yet Weston had good connections; and strong recommendations from N. A. C. Slotemaker de Bruine, director of the Netherlands Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, and even from the Dutch minister of foreign affairs, C. G. W. H. Boetzelaer van Oosterhout, finally made the authorities relen t.8
Weston and his wife arrived in Batavia in late March 1947. Here van Hoogstraaten gave him a most unfriendly welcome and instructed other department heads not to communicate with him, an order that was later withdrawn. After reentering Batavia from Singapore in May of that year, Weston was invited by the Republican govern ment to visit Yogyakarta. Weston was very enthusiastic over what he saw and con cluded that the Republic was actually much stronger than the Dutch had been will ing to admit. He saw no communist influence and found Sukarno and his ministers "extremely brilliant and clever." However, they did need experience and American support, he felt. Business should and could be done with the Republic, Weston in formed his superiors, and he was happy to report that on May 6 he and Republican officials had drawn up a contract by which the Overseas Corporation would sell and buy commodities for the Republic at a fair price on the world market. For its ser vices the Overseas Corporation would receive a commission of 2.5 percent of the value of all the goods exported and the same for commodities imported for the Re public . 9 6. On the Martin Behrman incident, see ib id ., pp. 253-70. The Weston affair demonstrated the gullibility and lack of experience of the young Republic. Its officials, some of whom, according to Sumitro, had displayed an "irresponsible degree of lightheartedness," should have been much more cautious in their efforts to establish economic contacts with the outside world. 11 On the other hand, Dutch officials were also taken in by what Stanley Hornbeck, the Amer ican ambassador to The Hague, called that "intriguer" Weston.12 In spite of various warnings by Netherlands Indies officials, The Hague felt that it owed the Westons something for their efforts to defend Netherlands policies in Indonesia. Could The Hague not have found better and more reliable individuals to influence American public opinion? During and after the Netherlands-Indonesian conflict, complaints were often voiced that much more could and should have been done by the Dutch government to influence American public opinion, because failure to explain the Netherlands' side of the conflict had resulted in adverse American policies. The issue of Dutch public affairs efforts in the United States 1945-49 merits further in vestigation; however, the choice of Weston does not speak well for whatever the Netherlands government saw fit to inform the American public The Hague was at tempting to do in postwar Indonesia.
While the Weston affair did not create much negative reaction in the Nether lands, the Matthew Fox contract aroused much resentment and added to anti-Ameri can sentiment during 1948-49. The Fox contract, it was felt by many in the Nether lands, symbolized and embodied real American intentions to effect the decolonization of Indonesia. The ultimate American objective, it was contended, was to drive Dutch economic interest out of Indonesia to be replaced by Wall S treet.13
In late December 1947 a lady in a hotel in Havana dropped a 37-page document that was picked up by a "friend of the Netherlands" who had it forwarded to the Dutch ambassador in Washington, E. commodities and the purchase of various consumer goods. For these services Fox would receive a commission of 7.5 percent for every ton moved. The corporation, which would be 51 percent American-and 49 percent Republican-owned, would also assist in the economic development and rehabilitation of Indonesia. Thus this con tract was not unlike the agreements between the Republic and Isbrandtsen and Weston except that neither of the previous two contracts had provided for financial and technical assistance to rebuild the postwar Indonesian economy. Furthermore, this latest contract had been concluded with a highly respected American business man . 11* Matthew Fox was born in Racine, Wisconsin, in 1911 and worked as a theater manager, film buyer, and assistant to the president of Skouras Theatre Corporation before he became vice-president of Universal Pictures in 1937. Because of his con siderable success in saving this company from bankruptcy, Fox became known as some kind of boy wonder of the American business world. During World War II Fox served on the War Planning Board and later in the US Army. He returned to Uni versal Pictures as executive vice president and also became chairman of the board of United World Films. In 1947 he resigned his $150,000 position as executive vice president in order to be able to devote much of his time and energy to the newly founded American-Indonesian Corporation.1 4 15
Fox was imaginative, aggressive, dynamic, rather clever, and also somewhat of an idealist and romantic. Thus, although he undoubtedly hoped to be able to make a considerable profit from this new business venture, he was also sincerely inter ested in helping the Indonesian Republic in its struggle for independence. In this respect he was quite unlike Weston and Isbrandtsen. Furthermore, Fox had excel lent contacts in the American business world and was in a position to attract a large amount of capital. Thus, van Kleffens was correct when he warned The Hague that Fox could not be easily written off and should be taken very seriously. 16 How did Fox initiate his contacts with Sumitro? Apparently Fox was approached in November 1947 to help the Republic to honor an $80,000 credit deposit in an Amer ican bank. Fox agreed to do so and subsequently suggested launching the AmericanIndonesian Corporation.17
Although the Netherlands government was undoubtedly tempted, it decided not to make public the information it had obtained concerning the Fox contract. Lieu tenant Governor-General H. van Mook favored publication, but van Kleffens rightly feared that disclosure of the information would be exploited by the Soviet Union, which would promptly brand the contract as an American capitalistic plot to gain control over and subvert the Indonesian economy. 18
Contrary to widely held public views in the Netherlands during the years 1948-1949 and even later, the State Department was very disturbed over the Fox contract and tried everything possible to thwart and discourage the venture. Fox and his associates, Robert Nathan and John Lee, were invited to the State Department, where they met officials on April 9, 1948, and were told that American-Republican trade would be a derogation of Netherlands sovereignty and might seriously disturb the delicate negotiations now in progress between the Netherlands and Yogyakarta, Furthermore, State Department officials stressed the monopolistic character of the con tract.19
The State Department also instructed the American consul-general in Batavia, Charles Livengood, and the head of the American delegation of the United Nations Good Offices Committee, Coert duBois, to inform the Republic of Washington's oppo sition to the contract. Furthermore, State Department officials met with Sumitro on April 21 and told him during a three-hour meeting that the contract violated the International Trade Agreement Charter and the Renville agreement. Sumitro de fended the contract by saying that his government had no confidence in the Nether lands. 20
In spite of State Department disapproval, Fox was undaunted and showed no desire to cancel the contract. Even after an unsuccessful business trip to Indone sia by representatives of Meyer and Brown, an American company in which Fox had considerable influence, to purchase commodities for the US Army-Navy Munitions Board he remained optimistic.21 Yet, in the summer of 1948 van Kleffens became afraid that Fox might do the Netherlands much harm if he were not seriously and properly handled. He was especially concerned that Fox might launch a press and radio campaign urging the discontinuation of EC A funds to the Netherlands. It was for these reasons that van Kleffens suggested a meeting with Fox. The Hague approved, and after a preliminary meeting with the Netherlands Indies trade repre sentative, Emile Zimmerman, van Kleffens met Fox on June 14, 1948. Van Kleffens saw Fox as a man of "short, squat stature" and a typical representative of the Jewish race. Fox impressed the Netherlands ambassador as being serious and "competent" and, although he seemed interested in making a profit from his busi ness venture, he also appeared anxious to make an important contribution to the economic reconstruction of Indonesia. Furthermore, Fox suggested to van Kleffens that a considerable portion of his profit be used to purchase commodities in the Netherlands. Finally, Fox even indicated a willingness to go to The Hague to nego tiate with officials there. The Dutch government indicated a few weeks later that it was willing to meet with Fox, and on August 20 Emile Zimmerman extended to him a formal invitation to go to The Hague to discuss his "projected operations" in parts of Indonesia. However, to the best of my knowledge no such meeting ever took place. 22
In the meantime, much of the content of the contract had become known. Re publican papers referred to the matter, and in early July D. U. Stikker, the future Netherlands foreign minister, commented on it rather extensively in an interview with the Algemeen Handelsblad. 23 2 4 General public opinion in the Netherlands, at that time and especially after the so-called Second Police Action of December 1948, was most negative. Somehow, in spite of State Department efforts to discourage the Fox contract, Dutch public opinion generally concluded that Washington and Wall Street had blessed the venture.
After the Second Police Action of December 1948, Fox had little opportunity to gather any substantial profits. Nor was he able to attract any outside American capital. Whatever capital was invested in the undertaking must have been his own and might never have been repaid. It is difficult to determine how much Fox in vested in the Indonesian venture. Perhaps at least $550,000 was given or "loaned" to the Republic, much of which was used to finance the Indonesian UN mission in New York. Furthermore, Fox might have spent some $215,000 to establish a socalled propaganda fund and paid $140,000 for two second-hand C-54 airplanes.21* Already in early 1949 Fox expressed a desire to withdraw from the AmericanIndonesian corporation and to annul the contract. In March 1950, shortly after the Republic gained sovereignty, the Indonesian government cancelled the contract and Fox expressed no re g re ts.25
The Fox contract was not a Wall Street capitalistic plot to secure a large portion of Indonesia's fabulous wealth. It was a business undertaking by a clever but also somewhat idealistic and naive American businessman who thought he could secure a good profit and at the same time make a substantial contribution to Indonesian inde pendence. Neither one of his expectations was realized. Fox did not gain material ly, and his contributions to Indonesia's independence were minimal. He was not a modern "American Lafayette" nor the "economic god-father" of the Indonesian Re public , as he has sometimes been described. 26
However, in a more subtle and indirect way the Fox contract did help the Re publican cause. The Indonesians used Fox to further their own policies. They might have considered him a somewhat naive and romantic American who could be used to bolster their international position. Weston was correct when he wrote that the Republican officials lacked experience, and their contract with him and the agreement with the Isbrandsten Company might have taught them to be more cau tious and more subtle. The issue of foreign affairs had been one of the principal points of contention between the Netherlands and the Republicans during their lengthy and protracted negotiations from 1947 until late 1948. The Republic refused to surrender what it considered to be its sovereign right to conduct foreign relations with other nations, while the Netherlands insisted that the Republic should subordinate itself to an in terim government during a transition period leading to independence. In 1948 the United States gradually shifted its strong pro-Netherlands position but supported the Dutch position as far as the issue of foreign affairs was concerned. Thus Wash ington, although tempted at times, had not recognized the Republic as a sovereign state. By the Fox contract the Republic achieved two objectives. It embarrassed and frightened the Dutch government, which feared the influence of a respectable businessman like Fox who might try and succeed in breaking the Dutch blockade. Furthermore, the Republic, while circumventing Washington, had established a valuable contact with the respectable American business world. Thus the Repub lie's international leverage had been increased.
